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Martin Feldstein 
The fundamental policy question of whether to go from a low inflation rate to 
price stability requires comparing the short-run cost of  disinflation with the 
permanent gain that results from a sustained lower rate of  inflation. Since that 
permanent gain is proportional to the level of GDP in each future year, the real 
value of the annual gain grows through time at the rate of growth of real GDP.’ 
If  this growing stream of  welfare gains is discounted by a risk-based dis- 
count rate like the net rate of return on equities, the present value of the future 
gain is equal to the initial annual value of  the net gain (G)  divided by  the 
difference between the appropriate discount rate (r)  and the growth rate of total 
GDP (g): thus PV = G/(r -  g). With a value of r equal to 5.1 percent (the real 
net-of-tax rate of  return on the Standard & Poor’s portfolio of  equities from 
1970 to 1994) and a projected growth rate of 2.5 percent, the present value of 
the gain is equal to almost 40 times the initial value of the gain.* 
Martin Feldstein is the George F.  Baker Professor of  Economics at  Harvard University and 
president of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
The current paper builds on my earlier study “The Costs and Benefits of  Going from Low 
Inflation to Price Stability,” which was distributed as NBER Working Paper no. 5469 and pub- 
lished in C. Romer and D. Romer, eds., Reducing Injarion: Motivation and Srrategy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997). I am grateful for comments on the earlier paper and for discus- 
sions about the current work with participants in the 1997 NBER conference, Reducing Injarion, 
to the authors of papers in the current project who served as members of the project working 
group, and to Erzo Luttmer and Larry Summers. 
1. This assumes that going from low inflation to price stability does not permanently affect the 
rate of economic growth. The unemployment and output loss associated with achieving a lower 
rate of inflation were discussed in section 3.2 of Feldstein (1997). That analysis assumed that there 
is a short-run Phillips curve but not a long-run Phillips curve. Both of those assumptions have been 
called into question and will be discussed in more detail in papers in this volume. I present my 
own view of this controversy in the introduction to this volume. 
2. In an earlier analysis of the gain from reducing inflation (Feldstein 1979), I noted that with a 
low enough discount rate the present value of the gain would increase without limit as the time 
horizon was extended. 
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The analysis developed below implies that the annual gain that would result 
from reducing inflation from 2 percent to zero would be equal to between about 
0.76 percent of GDP and 1.04 percent of GDP. The present value of this gain 
would therefore be between 30 and 40 percent of the initial level of GDP. The 
evidence cited in Ball (1994) implies that inflation could be reduced from 2 
percent to zero with a one-time output loss of  about 6 percent of  GDP. Al- 
though these estimates of  the benefits and costs are subject to much uncer- 
tainty, the difference between benefits and costs leaves little doubt that the 
aggregate present value benefit of  achieving price stability substantially ex- 
ceeds its cost. 
The paper begins by estimating the magnitude of the two major favorable 
components of the annual net gain that would result if  the true inflation rate 
were reduced from 2 percent to zero:3 (1) the reduced distortion in the timing 
of  consumption and (2) the reduced distortion in  the demand  for  owner- 
occupied housing. Each of  these calculations explicitly recognizes not only 
that the change in inflation alters household behavior but also that it alters tax 
revenue. Those revenue effects are important because any revenue gain from 
lower inflation permits a reduction in other distortionary taxes while any reve- 
nue loss from lower inflation requires an increase in some other distortionary 
Even a small reduction of inflation (from 2 percent to zero) can have a sub- 
stantial effect on economic welfare because inflation increases the tax-induced 
distortions that would exist even with price stability. The deadweight loss asso- 
ciated with 2 percent inflation is therefore not the traditional “small triangle” 
that would result from distorting a first-best equilibrium but is the much larger 
“trapezoid” that results from increasing a large initial distortion. 
These adverse effects of the tax-inflation interaction could in principle be 
eliminated by indexing the tax system or by shifting from our current system 
of corporate and personal income taxes to a tax based only on consumption or 
labor income. As a practical matter, however, such tax reforms are extremely 
unlikely. Section 3.8 of Feldstein (1997) discusses some of the difficulties of 
shifting to an indexed tax system in which capital income and expenses are 
measured in real terms. Although such a shift has been advocated for at least 
two decades, there has been no legislation along those lines.5  It is significant, 
moreover, that no industrial country has fully (or even substantially) indexed 
its taxation of investment income. Moreover, the annual gains from shifting to 
price stability that are identified in this paper exceed the costs of the transition 
3. I assume that the official measure of the rate of inflation overstates the true rate by 2 percent- 
age points. The text thus evaluates the gain of going from a 4  percent rate of  increase of  the 
consumer price index (CPI) to a 2 percent rate of increase. 
4.  Surprisingly, such revenue effects are generally ignored in welfare analyses on the implicit 
assumption that lost revenue can be replaced by lump-sum taxes. 
5.  Most recently, the indexing of capital gains was strongly supported by the Republican major- 
ity in the House of Representatives in the 1997 tax legislation but was opposed with equal vigor 
by the White House and was not part of the final legislation. 11  Capital Income Taxes and the Benefit of Price Stability 
within a very few years. Even if one could be sure that the tax-inflation distor- 
tions would be eliminated by changes in the tax system 10 years from now, the 
present value gain from price stability until then would probably exceed the 
cost of the inflation reduction. 
There are also some countervailing disadvantages of having price stability 
rather than continuing a low rate of inflation. The primary advantage of infla- 
tion that has been identified in the literature is the seigniorage that the govern- 
ment enjoys from the higher rate of money creation. This seigniorage revenue 
reduces the need for other distortionary taxes  and therefore eliminates the 
deadweight loss that such taxes would entail. This seigniorage gain in money 
creation must of course be measured net of the welfare loss that results from 
the distortion in money demand. In addition, the real cost of servicing the na- 
tional debt varies inversely with the rate of inflation (because the government 
bond rate rises point for point with inflation but the inflation premium is then 
subject to tax). Both of  these effects are explicitly taken into account in the 
calculations presented in this paper. 
As I noted in the introduction to this volume, there are several papers in this 
volume that go beyond the original analysis of Feldstein (1997). The paper by 
Cohen, Hassett, and Hubbard presented in chapter 5 estimates how reducing 
inflation affects the efficiency of business’s choices among different types of 
capital investments (structures and equipment of  different durabilities). The 
paper by  Desai and Hines (chap. 6)  shows how the closed economy analysis 
of  this paper can be extended to an open economy with flows of  trade and 
capital. The study by Groshen and Schweitzer (chap. 7) discusses the behavior 
of the labor market at low inflation, and the research by Andr6s and Hernando 
(chap. 8) examines the effect of  reducing inflation on the sustained rate of 
growth. 
Absolute price stability, as opposed to merely a lower rate of inflation, may 
bring a qualitatively different kind of benefit. A history of price stability may 
bring a “credibility bonus” in dealing with inflationary shocks. People who see 
persistent price level stability expect that it will persist in the future and that 
the government will respond to shocks in a way that maintains the price level. 
In contrast, if people see that the price level does not remain stable, they may 
have less confidence in the government’s ability or willingness to respond to 
inflation shocks in a way that maintains the initial inflation rate. If so, any given 
positive demand shock may lead to more inflation and may require a greater 
output loss to reverse than would be true in an economy with a history of 
stable prices. 
A stable price level is also a considerable convenience for anyone making 
financial decisions that involve future receipts and payments. While econo- 
mists may be very comfortable with the process of converting nominal to real 
amounts, many people have a difficult time thinking about rates of change, real 
rates of interest, and the like. Even among sophisticated institutional investors, 
it is remarkable how frequently projections of future returns are stated in nomi- 12  Martin Feldstein 
Table 1.1  Net Welfare Effect of Reducing Inflation from 2 Percent to Zero 
(changes as percent of GDP) 
Welfare Effect of 
Direct Effect  Revenue Change  Total Effect 
of Reduced 
Distortion  A = 0.4  A = 1.5  A = 0.4  A = 1.5 
Source of Change  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Consumption timing 
qsr  = 0.4  1.02  -0.07  -0.26  0.95  0.76 
qs, = 0  0.73  -0.17  -0.64  -0.56  0.08 
qsr  = 1.0  1.44  0.09  0.33  1.53  1.77 
Housing demand  0.10  0.12  0.45  0.22  0.55 
Money demand  0.02  -0.05  -0.19  -0.03  -0.17 
Debt service  n.a.  -0.10  -0.38  -0.10  -0.38 
Total 
qsr  = 0.4  1.14  -0.10  -0.38  1.04  0.76 
%,  = 0  0.85  -0.20  -0.16  0.65  0.08 
qs,  = 1.0  1.56  0.06  0.21  1.62  1.77 
Note: A 2 percent inflation rate corresponds to a rise in the CPI at 4 percent a year. The welfare 
effects reported here are annual changes in welfare. n.a.: not applicable. 
nal terms and based on past experience over periods with very different rates 
of inflation. 
I will not attempt to evaluate these benefits of reducing inflation even though 
some of them may be as large as the gains that I do measure. For the United 
States, the restricted set of benefits that I quantify substantially exceed (in pres- 
ent value at any plausible discount rate) the cost of  getting to price stability 
from a low rate of inflation. 
Table 1.1 summarizes the four types of welfare changes that are discussed 
in the remaining sections of the paper. The specific assumptions and parameter 
values will be discussed there. With the parameter values that seem most likely, 
the overall total effect of reducing inflation from 2 percent to zero, shown in 
the lower right-hand corner of the table, is to reduce the annual deadweight 
loss by between 0.76 percent of GDP and 1.04 percent of GDP. 
1.1  Inflation and the Intertemporal Allocation of Consumption 
Inflation reduces the real net-of-tax return to savers in many ways. At the 
corporate (or, more generally, the business) level, inflation reduces the value 
of depreciation allowances and therefore increases the effective tax rate. This 
lowers the rate of return that businesses can afford to pay for debt and equity 
capital. At the individual level, taxes levied on nominal capital gains and nomi- 
nal interest also cause the effective tax rate to increase with the rate of inflation. 
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a welfare loss by  distorting the allocation of consumption between the early 
years in life and the later years. Since the tax law creates such a distortion even 
when there is price stability, the extra distortion caused by inflation causes a 
first-order increased deadweight loss. 
As I emphasized in an earlier paper (Feldstein 1978), the deadweight loss 
that results from capital income taxes depends on the resulting distortion in the 
timing of consumption and not on the change in saving per se. Even if there is 
no change in saving (i.e., no reduction in consumption during working years), 
a tax-inflation-induced  decline in the rate of return implies a reduction in future 
consumption and therefore a deadweight loss. The current section calculates 
the general magnitude of  the reduction in this welfare loss that results from 
lowering the rate of inflation from 2 percent to zero.6 
To analyze the deadweight loss that results from a distortion of consumption 
over the individual life cycle, I consider a simple two-period model of individ- 
ual consumption. Individuals receive income when they are young. They save 
a portion, S, of that income and consume the rest. The savings are invested in 
a portfolio that earns a real net-of-tax return of  r. At the end of  T years, the 
individuals retire and consume C = (1 + r)T.  In this framework, saving can be 
thought of as expenditure (when young) to purchase retirement consumption at 
a price of p = (1 + r)-? 
Even in the absence of  inflation, the effect of the tax system is to reduce 
the rate of  return on saving and therefore to increase the price of  retirement 
consumption. As inflation increases, the price of retirement consumption in- 
creases further. Before looking at specific numerical values, I present graph- 
ically the welfare consequences of  these changes in the price of  retirement 
consumption. Figure 1.1 shows the individual's compensated demand for re- 
tirement consumption C as a function of the price of retirement consumption 
at the time that saving decisions are made (p). 
In the absence of both inflation and taxes, the real rate of return implies a 
price of p,, and the individual chooses to save enough to generate retirement 
consumption of C,.  With no inflation, the existing structure of capital income 
taxes at the business and individual levels raises the price of retirement con- 
sumption to p,  and reduces retirement consumption to C,.  This increase in the 
price of retirement consumption causes the individual to incur the deadweight 
loss shown as the shaded area A; that is, the amount that the individual would 
have to be compensated for the rise in the price of retirement consumption in 
order to remain at the same initial utility level exceeds the revenue collected 
by the government by an amount equal to the area A. Raising the rate of infla- 
tion from zero to 2 percent increases the price of retirement consumption to p2 
6.  Fischer (1981) used the framework of Feldstein (1978) to assess the deadweight loss caused 
by the effect of inflation on the return to savers. As the current analysis indicates, the problem is 
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Fig. 1.1  Retirement consumption 
and reduces retirement consumption to C,. The deadweight loss now increases 
by the trapezoidal area 
C + D  = (p, - po>(C1  - C,) +  o.5(P2 - P,)(C,  - C,). 
The revenue effect of  such tax changes are generally ignored in welfare 
analyses because it is assumed that any loss or gain in revenue can be offset 
by a lump-sum tax or transfer. More realistically, however, we must recognize 
that offsetting a revenue change due to a change in inflation involves distor- 
tionary taxes and therefore each dollar of revenue gain or loss has an additional 
effect on overall welfare. The net welfare effect of reducing the inflation rate 
from 2 percent to zero is therefore the combination of the traditional welfare gain 
(the trapezoid C + D) and the welfare gain (loss) that results from an increase 
(decrease) in tax revenue. I begin by evaluating the traditional welfare gain and 
then calculate the additional welfare effect of the changes in tax revenue. 
1.1.1  Welfare Gain from Reduced Intertemporal Distortion 
The annual welfare gain from reduced intertemporal distortion is 
(P,  - POXC, - C,) +  03P*  - P,)(C, - C,) 
=  [(p, - Po)  +  0.5(P, - P,)l(C, - CZ). 
The change in retirement consumption can be approximated as 
c, - c,  = (dC/dP)(P, - P,) =  C,(P2/C,)(dC/dP)(P,  - PJP2 
=  C2&CP[(P1 - P2YPZl. 15  Capital Income Taxes and the Benefit of Price Stability 
where E,,  < 0 is the compensated elasticity of retirement consumption with 
respect to its price (as evaluated at the observed initial inflation rate of 2 per- 
cent). Thus the gain from reduced intertemporal distortion is7 
(1) 
GI  =  [(PI  - Po) +  0.5(p2 - ~i)IcFc,[(~i  - ~2)/~21 
=  [(PI  - po)/p2 +  0.5(~2  - PI)/P~IP~C~E~~[(P~  - ~2)/~21. 
Note that if  there were no tax-induced distortion when the inflation rate is 
zero (p,  = p,,), GI would simplify to the traditional triangle formula for the 
deadweight loss of a price change from p,  to p2. 
To move from equation (1) to observable magnitudes, note that the compen- 
sated elasticity .sCp can be written in terms of  the corresponding uncompen- 
sated elasticity qcp  and the propensity to save out of exogenous income u  as8 
(2)  &cp  =  qcp +  u. 
Moreover, since saving and retirement consumption are related by S =  pC, the 
elasticity of retirement consumption with respect to its price and the elasticity 
of  saving with respect to the price of  retirement consumption are related by 
qcp  = qs, -  1. Thus 
=  qsp  +  u-  1  (3)  ECP 
(4) 
and 
G, =  [(PI  -  po)/p2 + 0.W2  -  ~4)/~21[(~2  -  ~1)/~21S2(1  -  qs, - 
where S,  = p2C2,  the gross saving of individuals at the early stage of the life 
cycle. 
To evaluate equation (4) requires numerical estimates of the price of future 
consumption at different inflation rates and without any tax, as well as esti- 
mates of gross saving, of the saving elasticity, and of the propensity to save out 
of  exogenous income. 
Injlation Rates and the Price of Retirement Consumption 
To calculate the price of retirement consumption, I assume the time interval 
between saving and consumption is 30 years; for example, the individual saves 
on average at age 45 and then dissaves at age 75. Thus p = (1 + r)-30,  where 
the value of r depends on the tax system and the rate of  inflation. From 1960 
through 1994, the pretax real return to capital in the U.S.  nonfinancial corpo- 
7. This could be stated as the difference between the areas of the two deadweight loss triangles 
corresponding to prices p,  and pz,  but the expression used here presents a better approximation. 
8. This follows from the usual  Slutsky decomposition: dCldp = (dC/dp),,,,  - C (dCldy), 
where dCldy is the increase in retirement consumption induced by an increase in exogenous in- 
come. Multiplying each term by plC and noting that p(dCldy) = dp Cldy = dSldy  = cr  yields 
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rate sector averaged 9.2 per~ent.~  Ignoring general equilibrium effects and tak- 
ing this as the measure of the discrete-time return per year that would prevail 
in the absence of taxes implies that the corresponding price of retirement con- 
sumption is po = (1  .092)-30 = 0.071  .lo 
Taxes paid by corporations to federal, state, and local governments equaled 
about 41 percent of the total pretax return during this period, leaving a real net 
return before personal taxes of 5.4 percent (Rippe 1995). I will take this yield 
difference as an indication of the combined effects of  taxes and inflation at 2 
percent (i.e., measured inflation at 4 percent) even though tax rules, tax rates, 
and inflation varied over this 35-year interval.” The net-of-tax rate of return 
depends not only on the tax at the corporate level but also on the taxes that 
individuals pay on that after-corporate-tax return, including the taxes on inter- 
est income, dividends, and capital gains. The effective marginal tax rate de- 
pends on the form of the income and on the tax status of the individual. I will 
summarize all of this by assuming a marginal “individual” tax rate of 25 per- 
cent. This reduces the net return from 5.4 to 4.05 percent. The analysis of the 
gain from reducing the equilibrium rate of inflation is not sensitive to the pre- 
cise level of this return or the precise difference between it and the 9.2 percent 
pretax return since our concern is with the ‘effect of  a difference in inflation 
rates on effective tax rates. Similarly, the precise level of the initial effective 
tax rate is not important to the current calculations since our concern is with 
the change in the effective tax rate that occurs as a result of  the change in 
9. This 9.2 percent is the ratio of profits before all taxes (including property taxes as well as 
income  taxes)  plus  real  net  interest  payments  to the  replacement  value of  the  capital  stock. 
Feldstein,  Poterba,  and Dicks-Mireaux  (1983) describe  the method of  calculation,  and Rippe 
(1995) brings the calculation up to date. Excluding property taxes would reduce this return by 
about 0.7  percentage points; see Poterba and Samwick (1995). 
10. An increase in the capital stock would depress the marginal product of capital (p) from its 
currently assumed value of 0.092. That means a smaller gain from the reduced intertemporal dis- 
tortion. The effect, however, is so small that given the approximations used throughout the analy- 
sis, it does not seem worth taking this into account. The following calculation shows that with an 
elasticity of saving with respect to the real interest rate of 0.4 (i.e., qXr  = 0.4) and a Cobb-Douglas 
technology, the marginal product of capital only falls from 0.092 to 0.089. 
To  see this, note that (as shown later in the text) the net return to savers at 2 percent inflation 
when the pretax yield is 9.2  percent is 0.4425(0.092) = 0.0407. The analysis in the text also shows 
that reducing inflation to zero raises the net return to 0.4425~  + 0.0049, where p is the marginal 
product of capital at the higher saving rate. 
If the saving rate (s) is a constant elasticity function of the expected net real return equal to 0.4, 
then sI/so = r(0.4425~  + 0.0049)/0.0407]04,  where sI is the saving rate with price stability and so 
is the saving rate at a 2 percent rate of inflation. 
A Cobb-Douglas technology implies y = P and therefore that p = bP-’.  In long-run equilib- 
rium, sy  = nk, where s  is the saving rate and n is the growth of population and technology. Thus 
p = bns-I.  More specifically, the observed marginal  product of  capital is 0.092  and satisfies 
0.092 = bns;’  while p = bns;l  defines the marginal product of capital with the saving rate that 
prevails when there is price stability. 
It follows that O.O92/p = sI/so = r(0.4425~  + 0.0049)/0.0407]0J.  Solving this gives p = 0.0889, 
or only about 3 percent below the value of 0.092 with the initial capital stock. Even with a saving 
response elasticity of  1, the marginal product of capital is 0.0866. 
11. The average rate of measured inflation during this period was actually 4.7 percent, implying 
an average “true” inflation rate of 2.7 percent. 17  Capital Income Taxes and the Benefit of Price Stability 
the equilibrium rate of  inflation.'* The price of  retirement consumption that 
corresponds to this net return of  4.05 percent is p2 = (1  .0405)-30 = 0.304, 
where the subscript 2 on the price indicates that this represents the price at an 
inflation rate of 2 percent. 
Reducing the equilibrium inflation rate from 2 percent to zero lowers the 
effective tax rate at both the corporate and individual levels. At the corporate 
level, changes in the equilibrium inflation rate alter the effective tax rate by 
changing the value of  depreciation allowances and by  changing the value of 
the deduction of interest payments. Because the depreciation schedule that is 
allowed for calculating taxable profits is defined in nominal terms, a higher 
rate of inflation reduces the present value of  the depreciation and thereby in- 
creases the effective tax rate.13 Auerbach (1978) showed that this relation can 
be approximated by a rule of thumb that increases taxable profits by 0.57 per- 
centage points for each percentage point of inflation. With a marginal corpo- 
rate income tax rate of  35 percent, a 2 percentage point decline in inflation 
raises the net-of-tax return through this channel by 0.35(0.57)(0.02) = 0.0040, 
or 0.40 percentage  point^.'^ 
The interaction of the interest deduction and inflation moves the after-tax 
yield in the opposite direction. If each percentage point of inflation raises the 
nominal corporate borrowing rate by  1 percentage point,I5 the real pretax cost 
of borrowing is unchanged but the corporation gets an additional deduction in 
calculating taxable income. With a typical debt-capital ratio of 40 percent and a 
statutory corporate tax rate of 35 percent, a 2 percent decline in inflation raises 
the effective tax rate by 0.35(0.40)(0.02) = 0.0028, or 0.28 percentage points. 
The net effect of going from a 2 percent inflation rate to price stability is 
therefore to raise the rate of  return after corporate taxes by  0.12 percentage 
points, from the 5.40 percent calculated above to 5.52 percent.I6 
12. Some explicit sensitivity calculations are presented below. 
13. See Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski (1978) for an analytic discussion of the effect of infla- 
tion on the value of depreciation allowances. 
14. It might be argued that Congress changes depreciation rates in response to changes in infla- 
tion in order to keep the real present value of depreciation allowances unchanged. But although 
Congress did enact more rapid depreciation schedules in the early 1980s, the decline in inflation 
since that time has not been offset by lengthening depreciation schedules and has resulted in a 
reduction in the effective rate of corporate income taxes. 
15. This famous Irving Fisher hypothesis of a constant real interest rate is far from inevitable 
in an economy with a complex nonneutral tax structure. E.g., if the only nonneutrality were the 
ability of corporations to deduct nominal interest payments and all investment were financed by 
debt at the margin, the nominal interest rate would rise by  1/(  1 -  T)  times the change in inflation, 
where T  is the statutory corporate tax rate. This effect is diminished, however, by the combination 
of historic cost depreciation, equity finance, international capital flows, and the tax rules at the 
level of the individual (see Feldstein 1983, 1994;  Hartman 1979). Despite the theoretical ambigu- 
ity, the evidence suggests that these various tax rules and investor behavior interact in practice in 
the United States to keep the real pretax rate of interest approximately unchanged when the rate 
of inflation changes (see Mishkin 1992). 
16. Note that although the margin of uncertainty about the 5.5 percent exceeds the calculated 
change in return of 0.12 percent, the conclusions of the current analysis are not sensitive to the 
precise level of the initial 5.5 percent rate of return. 18  Martin Feldstein 
Consider next how the lower inflation rate affects taxes at the individual 
level. Applying the 25 percent tax rate to the 5.52 percent return net of  the 
corporate tax implies a net yield of 4.14 percent, an increase of 0.09 percentage 
points in net yield to the individual because of the changes in taxation at the 
corporate level. In addition, because individual income taxes are levied on 
nominal interest payments and nominal capital gains, a reduction in the rate of 
inflation further reduces the effective tax rate and raises the real after-tax rate 
of return. 
The portion of  this relation that is associated with the taxation of nominal 
interest at the level of the individual can be approximated in a way that paral- 
lels the effect at the corporate level. If each percentage point of inflation raises 
the nominal interest rate by  1 percentage point, the individual investor’s real 
pretax return on debt is unchanged but the after-tax return falls by the product 
of the statutory marginal tax rate and the change in inflation. Assuming the 
same 40 percent debt share at the individual level as I assumed for the corpo- 
rate capital stock” and a 25 percent weighted average individual marginal tax 
rate implies that a 2 percentage point decline in inflation lowers the effective 
tax rate by 0.25(0.40)(0.02) = 0.0020, or 0.20 percentage points. 
Although the effective tax rate on the dividend return to the equity portion 
of individual capital ownership is not affected by inflation (except, of course, 
at the corporate level), a higher rate of inflation increases the taxation of capital 
gains. Although capital gains are now taxed at the same rate as other invest- 
ment income (up to a maximum capital gain rate of  28 percent at the federal 
level), the effective tax rate is lower because the tax is only levied when the 
stock is sold. As an approximation, I will therefore assume a 10 percent effec- 
tive marginal tax rate on capital gains. In equilibrium, each percentage point 
increase in the price level raises the nominal value of  the capital stock by  1 
percentage point. Since the nominal value of the liabilities remains unchanged, 
the nominal value of the equity rises by  1/(  1 -  b)  percentage points, where b 
is the debt-capital ratio. With b = 0.4 and an effective marginal tax on nominal 
capital gains of 8,  = 0.1, a 2 percentage point decline in the rate of inflation 
raises the real after-tax rate of return on equity by  Og[  1/(  1 -  b)]h  = 0.0033, 
or 0.33 percentage points. However, since equity represents only 60 percent of 
the individual’s portfolio, the lower effective capital gains tax raises the overall 
rate of return by only 60 percent of this 0.33 percentage points, or 0.20 percent- 
age points.’* 
Combining the debt and capital gains effects implies that reducing the infla- 
tion rate by 2 percentage points reduces the effective tax rate at the individual 
investor level by the equivalent of 0.40 percentage points. The real net return 
17. This ignores individual investments in government debt. Bank deposits backed by  noncor- 
porate bank assets (e.g., home mortgages) can be ignored as being within the household sector. 
18. The assumption that the share of debt in the individual’s portfolio is the same as the share 
of debt in corporate capital causes the I/( 1 -  b)  term to drop out of the calculation. More generally, 
the effect of  inflation on the individual’s  rate of return depends on the difference between the 
shares of debt in corporate capital and in the individual’s portfolio. 19  Capital Income Taxes and the Benefit of Price Stability 
to the individual saver is thus 4.54 percent, up 0.49 percentage points from the 
return when the inflation rate is 2 percentage points higher. The implied price 
of retirement consumption is pI = (  1.0454)-30 = 0.264. 
Substituting these values for the price of retirement consumption into equa- 
tion (4) implies” 
G,  =  0.092S2(1 -qsp - a). 
Saving Rates and Saving Behavior 
The value of S, in equation (5) represents saving during preretirement years 
at the existing rate of inflation. This is, of course, different from the national in- 
come account measure of personal saving since personal saving is  the difference 
between the saving of younger savers and the dissaving of retired dissavers. 
One strategy for approximating the value of S, is to use the relation between 
S, and the national income account measure of personal saving in an economy 
in steady state growth. In the simple overlapping generations model with saving 
proportional to income, saving grows at a rate of n + g, where n is the rate of 
population growth and g is the growth in per capita wages. This implies that the 
saving of young savers is (1 + n + g)T  times the dissaving of older dissavers.20 
Thus net personal saving (S,)  in the economy is related to the saving of the 
young (S,) according to 
(6)  s,  =  s, - (1 +  n +  g)-‘Sy. 
The value of S, that we need is conceptually equivalent to S,.  Real aggregate 
wage income grew in the United States at a rate of 2.6 percent between 1960 
and 1994. Using n + g = 0.026 and T = 30 implies that S,  = 1.86SN.  If we 
take personal saving to be approximately 5 percent of GDP,21  this implies that 
S,  = 0.09GDP.22 
19. To test the sensitivity of this result to the assumption about the pretax return and the effective 
corporate tax rate, I recalculated the retirement consumption prices using alternatives to the as- 
sumed values of 9.2 percent for the pretax return and 0.41 for the combined effective corporate 
tax rate. Raising the pretax rate of return from 9.2 to 10 percent only changed the deadweight loss 
value in eq. (5)  from 0.092 to 0.096; lowering the pretax rate of return from 9.2 to 8.4 percent 
lowered the deadweight loss value to 0.090. Increasing the effective corporate tax rate from 0.41 
to 0.50 with a pretax return of 9.2 only shifted the deadweight loss value in eq. (5)  from 0.092 to 
0.096. These calculations confirm that the effect of changing the equilibrium inflation rate is not 
sensitive to the precise values assumed for the pretax rate of  return and the effective baseline 
tax rate. 
20. Note that the spending of older retirees includes both the dissaving of their earlier savings 
and the income that they have earned on their savings. Net personal saving is only the difference 
between the saving of savers and the dissaving of dissavers. 
21. Some personal saving is of course exempt from personal income taxation, particularly sav- 
ings in the form of pensions, individual retirement accounts, and life insurance. What matters, 
however, for deadweight loss calculations is the full volume of saving and not just the part of it 
that is subject to current taxes. Equivalently, the deadweight loss of any distortionary tax depends 
on the marginal tax rate, even if some of the consumption of the taxed good is exempt from tax or 
is taxed at a lower rate. 
22. This framework can be extended to recognize that the length of the work period is roughly 
twice as long as the length of the retirement period without appreciably changing this result. 20  Martin Feldstein 
If  the propensity to save out of  exogenous income (a)  is the same as the 
propensity to save out of wage income, u =  S2/(a  * GDP), where a  is the share 
of wages in GDP. With a  = 0.75, this implies u = 0.12. 
The final term to be evaluated in order to calculate the welfare gain de- 
scribed in equation (5)  is the elasticity of saving with respect to the price of 
retirement consumption. Since the price of retirement consumption is given by 
p = (1 + T)-~,  the uncompensated elasticity of saving with respect to the price 
of retirement consumption can be restated as an elasticity with respect to the 
real rate of return: qs,  = -  rTqsp/(  1 + r).  Thus equation (5) becomes 
(7)  G,  =  0.092S2[1  + (1 +  r)qsr/rT  - 01. 
Estimating the elasticity of saving with respect to the real net rate of return 
has proved to be very difficult because of the problems involved in measuring 
changes in expected real net-of-tax returns and in holding constant in the time- 
series data the other factors that affect saving. The large literature on this sub- 
ject generally finds that a higher real rate of return either raises the saving rate 
or has no effect at all.23  In their classic study of the welfare costs of U.S.  taxes, 
Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley (1985) assumed a saving elasticity of qs,  = 0.40. 
I will take this as the benchmark value for the current study. In this case, equa- 
tion (7) implies (with r = 0.04) 
G,  =  0.092S2[1 + (1 +  r)qsr/rT  - U] 
(8) 
=  0.092(0.09)(1 +  0.42/1.2 - 0.12)GDP  =  0.0102GDP. 
The annual gain from reduced distortion of consumption is equal to 1.02 per- 
cent of GDP. This figure is shown in the first row of table 1.1. 
To assess the sensitivity of this estimate to the value of qSrr  I will also exam- 
ine two other values. The limiting case in which changes in real interest rates 
have no effect on saving, that is, in which qs,  = 0, implies" 
(9) 
G,  =  0.092S2[1  + (1 +  r)qsr/rT - U] 
=  0.092(0.09)(1 - 0.12)GDP  =  0.0073GDP, 
that is, an annual welfare gain equal to 0.73 percentage points of GDP. 
If we assume instead that qsr = 1.0, that is, that increasing the real rate of 
return from 4.0  to 4.5 percent (the estimated effect of dropping the inflation 
rate from 2 percent to zero) raises the saving rate from 9 to 10.1 percent, the 
welfare gain is G, = 0.0144GDP. 
These calculations suggest that the traditional welfare effect on the timing 
of consumption of reducing the inflation rate from 2 percent to zero is probably 
23. See among others Blinder (1975), Boskin (1978), Evans (1983), Feldstein (forthcoming), 
24. This is a limiting case in the sense that empirical estimates of qs,  are almost always positive. 
Hall (1988), Makin (1987), Mankiw (1987), and Wright (1969). 
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bounded between 0.73 percent of GDP and 1.44  percent of GDP. These figures 
are shown in the second and third rows of table 1.1. 
1.1.2  Revenue Effects of a Lower Inflation Rate Causing 
a Lower Effective Tax on Investment Income 
As I noted earlier, the traditional assumption in welfare calculations and the 
one that is implicit in the calculation of subsection 1.1.1 is that any revenue 
effect can be offset by lump-sum taxes and transfers. When this is not true, as 
it clearly is not in the U.S. economy, an increase in tax revenue has a further 
welfare advantage because it permits reduction in other distortionary taxes 
while a loss of tax revenue implies a welfare cost of using other distortionary 
taxes to replace the lost revenue. The present subsection calculates the effect 
on tax revenue paid by  the initial generation of  having price stability rather 
than a 2 percent inflation rate and discusses the corresponding effect on eco- 
nomic welfare. 
Reducing the equilibrium rate of inflation raises the real return to savers and 
therefore reduces the price of retirement consumption. The effect of this on 
government revenue depends on the change in retirement consumption. Calcu- 
lating how the higher real net return on saving affects tax revenue requires 
estimating how individuals respond to the higher return. In particular, it re- 
quires deciding whether the individuals look ahead and take into account the 
fact that the government will have to raise some other revenue (or reduce 
spending) to offset the lower revenue collected on the income from savings. 
I believe that the most plausible specification assumes that individuals rec- 
ognize the real after-tax rate of return that they face but that those individuals 
do not take into account the fact that the government will in the future have to 
raise other taxes to offset the revenue loss that results from the lower effective 
tax on investment income. They in effect act as if  “someone else” (the next 
generation?) will pay the tax to balance the loss of tax revenue that results from 
the lower inflation rate. This implies that the response of saving that is used to 
calculate the revenue effect of  lower inflation should be the uncompensated 
elasticity of saving with respect to the net rate of return (qSJz5 
At the initial level of retirement consumption, reducing the price of future 
consumption from p,  to p,  reduces revenue (evaluated as of the initial time) by 
(p, -  p,)C,.  If the fall in the price of retirement consumption causes retirement 
consumption to increase from C,  to C,,  the government collects additional rev- 
enue equal to (p, -  p,)(C, -  C,). Even if  C,  < C,, the overall net effect on 
revenue, (p, -  p,)(C, -  C,)  -  (p, -  p,)C,, can in theory be either positive 
or negative. 
In the present case, the change in revenue can be calculated as 
25. If  individuals believed that they face a future tax liability to replace the  revenue that the 
government loses because of the decline in the  effective tax rate, the saving response would be 
estimated by using the compensated elasticity. This was the assumption made in the earlier version 
of these calculations presented in Feldstein (1997). 22  Martin Feldstein 
dREV  = (pi - P,)(CI - C2) - (P, -  PI)^, 
= (PI - P,)(dC/dP)(P,  - P2) - (P? - PI)C? 
= (PI - P&PI  - P*)(dC/dP)(P,/C,)(C,/p,)  - (P, - P,)C2 
= (PI - P,)(Pl - P2)r)cp(C,/P2) - (P, - PI)C*. 
(10) 
Replacing p,C, by  S, and recalling from equation (3) that qcp  = qsp  -  1 yields 
(11)  dREV = S,{[(P, -  P,)/P,I[(P~  -  Pi)/P2I(1 -  Tsp) -  (P?  -  PI)/PzJ. 
Substituting the prices derived in the previous section (p, = 0.071, pi = 
0.264, and p2  = 0.304) implies 
(12) 
dREV  =  S2[0.0836(1 - qsp)  - 0.13161 
=  (0.0836[1 + (1 +  r)qsr/rZ']  - 0.1316). 
The benchmark case of  qs, = 0.4 implies dREV = -0.019S2 or, with S,  = 
0.09GDP as derived above, dREV = -0.0017GDP. 
The limiting case of qsr = 0 implies dREV = -0.0043GDP,  while qs, = 
1  .O  implies dREV = 0.0022GDP. 
Thus, depending on the elasticity of saving with respect to the rate of inter- 
est, the revenue effect of shifting from 2 percent inflation to price stability can 
be either negative or positive. 
1.1.3  Welfare Gain from the Effects of Reduced 
Inflation on Consumption Timing 
We  can now combine the traditional welfare gain (G, of  eqs. [8] and [9]) 
with the welfare consequences of the revenue change (dWV of eqs. [  111 and 
[12]). If  each dollar of revenue that must be raised from other taxes involves a 
deadweight loss of A,  the net welfare gain of  shifting from 2 percent inflation 
to price stability is 
(134  G,  = (0.0102 - 0.0017A)GDP  ifqs,  =  0.4. 
Similarly, 
(13b)  G,  = (0.0073 - 0.0043A)GDP  ifqs,  =  0, 
and 
(13c)  G2 = (0.0144 +  0.0022X)GDP  if qsr =  1.0. 
The value of  A  depends on  the change in taxes that is used to adjust to 
changes in revenue. Ballard et al. (1985) used a computable general equilib- 
rium model to calculate the effect of increasing all taxes in the same proportion 
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and 55 cents, depending on parameter assumptions. I will represent this range 
by  A = 0.40. Using this implies that the net welfare gain of reducing inflation 
from 2 percent to zero equals 0.95 percent of GDP in the benchmark case of 
qsr = 0.4. The welfare effect of reduced revenue (-0.07  percent of  GDP) is 
shown in column (2)  of  table  1.1 and the combined welfare effect of  0.95 
percent of GDP is shown in column (4) of table 1.1. 
In the two limiting cases, the net welfare gains corresponding to X = 0.4 are 
0.56 percent of GDP with qs, = 0 and 1.53 percent of GDP with -qs, = 1.0. 
These are shown in the second and third rows of column (4) of table 1.1. 
The analysis of Ballard et al. (1985) estimates the deadweight loss of higher 
tax rates on the basis of the distortion in labor supply and saving. No account 
is taken of the effect of higher tax rates on tax avoidance through spending on 
deductible items or receiving income in nontaxable forms (fringe benefits, 
nicer working conditions, etc.). In a recent paper (Feldstein 1995a), I showed 
that these forms of tax avoidance as well as the traditional reduction of earned 
income can be included in the calculation of the deadweight loss of changes in 
income tax rates by  using the compensated elasticity of taxable income with 
respect to the net-of-tax rate. Based on an analysis of the experience of high- 
income taxpayers before and after the 1986 tax rate reductions, I estimated 
that elasticity to be 1.04 (Feldstein 1995b). Using this elasticity in the NBER 
TAXSIM model, I then estimated that a 10 percent increase in all individual 
income tax rates would cause a deadweight loss of  about $44 billion at 1994 
income levels; since the corresponding revenue increase would be $2  1 billion, 
the implied value of  A is 2.06. 
A subsequent study (Feldstein and Feenberg 1996) based on the 1993 tax 
rate increases suggests a somewhat smaller compensated elasticity of  about 
0.83 instead of the 1.04 value derived in the earlier study. Although this differ- 
ence may reflect the fact that the 1993 study is based on the experience during 
the first year only, I will be conservative and assume a lower deadweight loss 
value of A = 1.5. 
With  A  = 1.5, equations (13a), (13b), and (13c) imply a wider range of 
welfare gain estimates: reducing inflation from 2 percent to zero increases the 
annual level of welfare by 0.63 percent of GDP in the benchmark case of qsr  = 
0.4. With qsr  = 0 the net effect is a very  small gain of 0.08 percent of GDP, 
while with qs,  = 1.0 the net effect is a substantial gain of  1.77 percent of GDP. 
These values are shown in columns (3) and (5) of table 1.1. 
These are of course just the annual effects of inflation on savers’ intertempo- 
ral allocation of consumption. Before turning to the other effects of inflation, 
it is useful to say a brief word about nonsavers. 
1.1.4  Nonsavers 
A striking fact about American households is that a large fraction of house- 
holds have no financial assets at all. Almost 20 percent of U.S. households with 
heads aged 55 to 64 had no net financial assets at all in 1991, and 50 percent 24  Martin Feldstein 
of U.S. households had assets under $8,300; these figures exclude mortgage 
obligations from financial liabilities. 
The absence of substantial savings does not imply that individuals are irra- 
tional or unconcerned with the need to finance retirement consumption. Since 
social security benefits replace more than two-thirds of after-tax income for a 
worker who has had median lifetime earnings and many employees can antici- 
pate private pension payments in addition to social security, the absence of 
additional financial assets may be consistent with rational life cycle behavior. 
For these individuals, zero savings represents a constrained optimum.26 
In the presence of private pensions and social security, the shift from low 
inflation to price stability may  cause some of  these households to save, and 
that increase in saving may increase their welfare and raise total tax revenue. 
Since the calculated welfare gain that I reported earlier in this section is pro- 
portional to the amount of saving by preretirement workers, it ignores the po- 
tential gain to current nonsavers. 
Although the large number of nonsavers and their high aggregate income 
imply that this effect could be important, I have no way to judge how the in- 
creased rate of return would actually affect behavior. I therefore leave this out 
of the calculations, only noting that it implies that my estimate of the gain from 
lower inflation is to this extent undervalued. 
1.1.5  Relation between Observed Saving Behavior 
and the Compensated Elasticity 
Subsection 1.1.1 estimates the compensated elasticity of demand for retire- 
ment consumption with respect to its price in terms of forgone preretirement 
consumption (E~.) from the relation between the “observable” elasticity of sav- 
ing with respect to the net-of-tax rate (qSJ  and the value of  cCp  implied by 
utility theory in a life cycle model. More specifically, the analysis uses a life 
cycle model in which income is received in the first period of life and is used 
to finance consumption during those years and during retirement. 
This is of course not equivalent to assuming that all income is received at 
the beginning of the working years. The assumption in the calculations is that 
the time between the receipt of  earnings and the time when retirement con- 
sumption takes place is T = 30 years, essentially treating income as if it occurs 
in the middle of the working life at age 45 and dissaving as if it occurs in the 
middle of the retirement years at age 75. These may be reasonable approxima- 
tions to the “centers of gravity” of these life cycle phases. 
It can be argued, however, that many individuals also receive a significant 
amount of exogenous income during retirement (social security benefits) and 
26. The observed small financial balances of such individuals may be precautionary balances or 
merely transitory funds that will soon be spent. It would be desirable to refine the calculations of 
this section to recognize that some of the annual national income account savings are for precau- 
tionary purposes. Since there is no satisfactory closed-form expression relating the demand for 
precautionary saving to the rate of interest, I have not pursued that calculation further. 25  Capital Income Taxes and the Benefit of  Price Stability 
that taking this into account changes the relation between the “observed” qsr 
and the implied value of  ccP.  In thinking about this, it is important to think 
about the group in the population that generates the deadweight losses that we 
are calculating. This group excludes those who do no private saving and de- 
pend just on their social security retirement benefits to finance retirement con- 
sumption. More generally, in deciding on the importance of  social security 
benefits relative to retirement consumption (the key parameter in the adjust- 
ment calculation that follows), we  should think about a “weighted average” 
with weights proportional to the amount of regular saving that the individuals 
do. This implies a much lower value of benefits relative to retirement consump- 
tion than would be obtained by  an unweighted average for the population as a 
whole. I have not done such a calculation but think that an estimate of social 
security benefits being 25 percent of total retirement consumption may be ap- 
propriate for this purpose. 
To see how this would affect the results, we use the basic Slutsky equation 
cCp  = qcp  + u (where cCp  is the compensated elasticity of retirement consump- 
tion with respect to its price in terms of forgone consumption during working 
years, qcp  is the corresponding uncompensated elasticity, and u is the propen- 
sity to save) and the retirement period budget constraint C = S/p + B (where 
C is the retirement consumption, S is the saving during working years, p is the 
price of retirement consumption in terms of forgone consumption during the 
working years, and B is social security benefits). Taking derivatives of the re- 
tirement period budget constraint with respect to the price of retirement con- 
sumption implies [(C -  B)/Clq, = qcp  + [(C -  B)/Cl.27 
Combining this with the Slutsky equation implies ccp = [(C -  B)/q(qsp  - 
1) + u. Shifting from the price elasticity to the interest rate elasticity using 
qsp  = -(1  + r)q,)rTleads  finally to 
-Ecp  = [(C - B)/C][(l  +  r)qsr/rT  +  13  - u. 
To  see how taking this exogenous income into account alters the implied 
estimate of  cCp,  consider the following values based on the standard assump- 
tions that r = 0.04, T = 30, and u = 0.12: 
Implied Value of -E,-- 
Benefit-Consumption Ratio  qs, = 0  qsr  = 0.4 
Zero 
0.25 
0.88  1.227 
0.6  0.89 
Thus the assumption that the individual receives exogenous income during re- 
tirement that finances 25 percent of retirement consumption reduces the im- 
plied value of the compensated elasticity of demand by about one-fourth. 
27. When there are no social security benefits, this reduces to the familiar relation qsp  = qcp  + 1. 26  Martin Feldstein 
Table 1.2  Net Welfare Effect of Reducing Inflation with Exogenous Retirement 
Income (changes as percent of GDP) 
Welfare Effect of 
Direct Effect  Revenue Change  Total Effect 
of Reduced 
Source of Change  Distortion  A = 0.4  A = 1.5  A = 0.4  A = 1.5 
Total 
qs, = 0.4  0.86  -0.10  -  0.38  0.76  0.48 
qs, = 1.0  1.18  0.06  0.21  1.24  1.39 
rls, = 0  0.64  -0.20  -0.76  0.44  -0.12 
Note:  Calculations relate to reducing inflation from 2 percent to price stability (i.e., from a 4 
percent annual increase in the CPI to a 2 percent annual increase). Exogenous retirement income 
is 25 percent of retirement consumption among the relevant group of individual savers. 
This reduces the implied welfare gain in one category of table 1.1, the “di- 
rect effect of reduced consumption distortion.” To see the magnitude of  this 
reduction, rewrite equation (7) as 
(7’)  GI  =  0.092S2{[(C - B)/C][l + (1 +  r)qsr/rT] - u}. 
With BIC = 0.25 and qsr  = 0.4, this implies GI = 0.0074GDP instead of the 
value of 0.0102GDP obtained for B = 0. Similarly, with qs, = 0 the value of 
GI  declines from 0.0073GDP to 0.0052GDP, while with qsr  = 1 the decline is 
from 0.0144GDP to 0.0106GDP. These results are summarized in table 1.2, 
which corresponds to the three summary lines at the bottom of table 1.1. 
1.2  Inflationary Distortion of the Demand 
for Owner-Occupied Housing 
Owner-occupied housing receives special treatment under the personal in- 
come tax. Mortgage interest payments and local property taxes are deducted, 
but no tax is imposed on the implicit “rental” return on the capital invested in 
the property. This treatment would induce too much consumption of housing 
services even in the absence of inflation.28 
Inflation reduces the cost of owner-occupied housing services in two ways. 
The one that has been the focus of the literature on this subject (e.g., Rosen 
1985) is the increased deduction of nominal mortgage interest payments. Since 
the real rate remains unchanged while the tax deduction increases, the subsidy 
increases and the net cost of housing services declines. In addition, inflation 
increases the demand for owner-occupied housing by  reducing the return on 
investments in the debt and equity of corporations. 
Reducing the rate of  inflation therefore reduces the deadweight loss that 
28. This section benefits from the analysis in Poterba (1984, 1992) but differs from the frame- 
work used there in a number of ways. 27  Capital Income Taxes and the Benefit of Price Stability 
results from excessive demand for housing services. In addition, a lower infla- 
tion rate reduces the loss of tax revenue; if raising revenue involves a dead- 
weight loss, this reduction in the loss of tax revenue to the housing subsidy 
provides an additional welfare gain. 
1.2.1 
ing capital (R,) reflects the opportunity cost of the resources: 
(14)  R,  =  p+ m+  6, 
where p is the real return on capital in the nonhousing sector, m  is the cost of 
maintenance per dollar of  housing capital, and 6 is the rate of depreciation. 
With p = 0.092  (the average pretax real rate of return on capital in the nonfi- 
nancial corporate sector between 1960 and 1994), m = 0.02,  and 6 = 0.02,29 
R, = 0.132; the rental cost of  owner-occupied housing would be  13.2 cents 
per dollar of housing capital. 
Consider in contrast the corresponding implied rental cost per  dollar of 
housing capital under the existing tax rules for a couple who itemize their 
tax return: 
(15)  RZ = ~(1  -  8)im  + (1 -  p)(r,,  + IT) + (1 -  8)Tp + m + S -  IT, 
where RZ is the rental cost of an itemizer, p is the ratio of the mortgage to the 
value of the house, 8 is the marginal income tax rate, i, is the interest rate paid 
on the mortgage, r” is the real net rate of return available on portfolio invest- 
ments, T~ is the rate of property tax,30  m and 6 are as defined above, and IT is 
the rate of inflation (assumed to be the same for goods in general and for house 
prices). This equation says that the annual cost of owning a dollar’s worth of 
housing is the sum of the net-of-tax mortgage interest payments p(1 -  8)i, 
plus the opportunity cost of the equity invested in the house (1 -  p)(r,,  + n) 
plus the local property tax reduced by the value of the corresponding tax de- 
duction (1 -  8)Tp plus the maintenance m and depreciation 6 less the infla- 
tionary gain on the property IT. 
In 1991, the year for which other data on housing used in this section were 
derived, the rate on conventional mortgages was  i,  = 0.072 and the rate of 
inflation was IT = 0.01  .31 The assumption that di,/d.rr  = 1 implies that i, would 
be 0.082 at an inflation rate of  IT = 0.0Z3*  Section 1.1 derived a value of r, = 
0.0405 for the real net return on a portfolio of debt and equity securities when 
Welfare Gain from Reduced Distortion of Housing Consumption 
In the absence of taxes, the implied rental cost of housing per dollar of hous- 
29. These values of m  and 6 are from Poterba (1992). 
30. Following Poterba (1992) I assume that T~  = 0.025. 
31. The CPI rose by  3.1 percent from December 1990 to  December 1991, implying a “true” 
inflation rate  of  1.1 percent. While previous rates were higher, subsequent inflation rates have 
been lower. 
32. The assumption that di,,,/d.ir = 1 is the  same assumption made in  section 1.1. See n. 15 
above for the reason that I use this approximation. 28  Martin Feldstein 
IT  = 0.02. With a typical mortgage-to-value ratio among itemizers of  p = 
0.5,33  a marginal tax rate of 8 = 0.25,  a property tax rate of T~ = 0.025, m = 
0.02, and 6 = 0.02, the rental cost per dollar of housing capital for an itemizer 
when the inflation rate is 2 percent is RI, = 0.0998. Thus the combination of 
the tax rules and a 2 percent inflation rate reduces the rental cost from 13.2 
cents per dollar of housing capital to 9.98 cents per dollar of housing capital. 
Consider now the effect of a decrease in the rate of inflation on this implicit 
rental cost of owner-occupied housing: 
(16)  dRI/dT  =  p(1 - 8)dim/dn  + (1 - p)d(r, +  a)/dn  - 1. 
Section 1.1 showed that if each percentage point increase in the rate of inflation 
raises the rate of interest by  1 percentage point, the real net rate of return on a 
portfolio of corporate equity and debt decreases from r, = 0.0454 at T = 0 to 
rn = 0.0405 at IT  = 0.02; that is, dr,/d.rr = -0.245  and d(r, + .rr)/d.rr = 0.755. 
Thus with 8 = 0.25,  dRI/dn = 0.75~  + 0.755(1 -  p) -  1.  For an itemizing 
homeowner with a mortgage-to-value ratio of p = 0.5, dRI/d.rr = -0.25.  Since 
RI, = 0.0998 at 2 percent inflation, dRI/dr = -0.25  implies that RI, = 0.1048 
at zero inflation. The lower rate of inflation implies a higher rental cost per 
unit of housing capital and therefore a smaller distortion. 
Before calculating the deadweight loss effects of the reduced inflation, it is 
necessary to derive the corresponding expressions for homeowners who do not 
itemize their deductions. For such nonitemizers mortgage interest payments 
and property tax payments are no longer tax deductible, implying that34 
(17)  RN  =  pi,  + (1 - p)(rn +  IT) +  T,,  +  m +  6 - IT. 
The parametric assumptions made for itemizers, modified only by assuming a 
lower mortgage-to-value ratio among nonitemizers of p = 0.2, implies RN, = 
0.1098 and RN, = 0.1137. Both values are higher than the corresponding val- 
ues for itemizers, but both imply substantial distortions that are reduced when 
the rate of inflation declines from 2 percent to zero. 
Figure 1.2  shows the nature of the welfare gain from reducing inflation for 
taxpayers who itemize. The figure presents the compensated demand curve 
relating the quantity of  housing capital demanded to the rental cost of  such 
housing. With no taxes, Ro = 0.132 and the amount of housing demanded is 
Ho.  The combination of the existing tax rules at zero inflation reduces the rental 
cost to R, = 0.1048 and increases housing demand to H,.  Since the real pretax 
33. The relevant p ratio is not that on new mortgages or on the overall stock of all mortgages 
but on the stock of mortgages of itemizing taxpayers. The Balance Sheets for the U.S. Economy 
indicate that the ratio of home mortgage debt to the value of owner-occupied real estate increased 
to 43 percent in 1994. I use a higher value to reflect the fact that not all homeowners are itemizers 
and that those who do itemize are likely to have higher mortgage-to-value ratios. The results of 
this section are not sensitive to the precise level of this parameter. 
34. This formulation assumes that taxpayers who do not itemize mortgage deductions do not 
itemize at all and therefore do not deduct property tax payments. Some taxpayers may in fact 
itemize property tax deductions even though they no longer have a mortgage. 29  Capital Income Taxes and the Benefit of  Price Stability 
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cost of providing housing capital is R,,  the tax-inflation combination implies a 
deadweight loss shown by area A, that is, the area between the cost of provid- 
ing the additional housing and the demand curve. A rise in inflation to 2 percent 
reduces the rental cost of housing further to R, = 0.0998 and increases the 
demand for housing to H,. The additional deadweight loss is the area C + D 
between the real pretax cost of providing the increased housing and the value 
to the users as represented by the demand curve. 
Thus the reduction in the deadweight loss that results from reducing the 
distortion to housing demand when the inflation rate declines from 2 percent 
to zero is 
(18)  G,  = (R, - R,)(H, - H,) +  0.5(R, - R,)(H, - Hi). 
With a linear approximation, 
G,  =  (R, - R,)(dH/dR)(R,  - R,) 
+  0.5(R, - R,)(dH/dR)(R, - R,) 
(19) 
=  -(R,/H,)(dH/dR)"R,  - R,YR,Ir(R, - R,YR,I 
+ 0.5(Ri - R,)2R;2}R2H,. 
Writing  E~~  = -(R,/H,)(dH/dR)  for the absolute value of  the compensated 
elasticity of housing demand with respect to the rental price (at the observed 
values of R, and H,) and substituting the rental values for an itemizing tax- 
payer yields 
=  0.0149~~~  RI, HI,. 
(20) 
A similar calculation for nonitemizing homeowners yields 
GI,  =  &,[(0.273)(0.050) +  0.5(0.050)2]RZ,HI, 30  Martin Feldstein 
(21)  GN,  =  0.0065~~~  RN, HN, . 
Combining these two equations on the assumption that the compensated 
elasticities of  demand are the same for itemizers and nonitemizers gives the 
total welfare gain from the reduced distortion of housing demand that results 
from reducing equilibrium inflation from 2 percent to zero: 
(22)  G,  =  ~,(0.0149RZ,HZ,  + O.0O65RN,HN2). 
Since the calculations of the rental rates take into account the mortgage-to- 
value ratios, the relevant measures of HZ2 and HN,  are the total market values 
of owner-occupied housing of itemizers and nonitemizers. In 199  1, there were 
60 million owner-occupied housing units and 25 million taxpayers who item- 
ized mortgage  deduction^.^^ Since the total 1991 value of owner-occupied real 
estate of $6,440 billion includes more than just single-family homes (e.g., two- 
family homes and farms), I take the value of owner-occupied  homes (including 
the owner-occupiers' portion of two-family homes) to be $6,000 billion. The 
Internal Revenue Service reported that tax revenue reductions in 1991 due to 
mortgage deductions were $42 billion, implying approximately $160 billion 
of mortgage deductions and therefore about $2,000 billion of mortgages. The 
mortgage-to-value ratio among itemizers of 0.5 implies that the market value 
of housing owned by itemizers is HI, = $4,000 billion. This implies that the 
value of housing owned by nonitemizers is HN,  = $2,000 billion. 
Substituting these estimates into equation (22), with RZ, = 0.0998 and 
RN,  = 0.1098, implies that 
(23)  G,  =  $7.4~"~  billion. 
Using Rosen's (1985) estimate of eHR  = 0.8 implies that this gain from reduc- 
ing the inflation rate is $5.9 billion at 1991 levels. Since 1991 GDP was $5,723 
billion, this gain is 0.10 percent of GDP. 
1.2.2  Revenue Effects of Lower Inflation on the 
Subsidy to Owner-Occupied Housing 
The G, gain is based on the traditional assumption that changes in tax reve- 
nue do not affect economic welfare because they can be offset by other lump- 
sum taxes and transfers. The more realistic assumption that increases in tax 
revenue permit reductions in other distortionary taxes implies that it is impor- 
tant to calculate also the reduced tax subsidy to housing that results from a 
lower rate of inflation. 
The magnitude of the revenue change depends on the extent to which the 
35. The difference between these two figures reflects the fact that many homeowners do not 
itemize mortgage deductions (because they have such small mortgages that they benefit more from 
using the standard deduction or have no mortgage at all) and that many homeowners own more 
than one residence. 31  Capital Income Taxes and the Benefit of Price Stability 
reduction in inflation shifts capital from owner-occupied housing to the busi- 
ness sector. To  estimate this I use the compensated elasticity of housing with 
respect to the implicit rental value,36  cHR  = 0.8. The 5 percent increase in the 
rental price of  owner-occupied housing for itemizers from RZ,  = 0.0998 at 
n = 0.02 to RZ, = 0.1048 at zero inflation implies a 4 percent decline in the 
equilibrium stock of owner-occupied housing, from $4,000 billion to $3,840 
billion (at 1991 levels). Similarly, for nonitemizers, the 3.6 percent increase in 
the rental price from RN, = 0.1098 at n = 0.02 to RN, = 0.1137 at zero 
inflation implies a 2.9 percent decline in their equilibrium stock of  owner- 
occupied housing, from $2,000 billion to $1,942 billion (at 1991 levels). 
Consider first the reduced subsidy on the $3,840 billion of remaining hous- 
ing  stock owned by  itemizing taxpayers. Maintaining the assumption of  a 
mortgage-to-value ratio of 0.5 implies total mortgages of $1,920 billion on this 
housing capital. The 2 percentage point decline in the rate of inflation reduces 
mortgage interest payments by $38.4 billion and, assuming a 25 percent mar- 
ginal tax rate, increases tax revenue by $9.6 billion. 
The shift of capital from owner-occupied housing to the business sector af- 
fects revenue in three ways. First, itemizers lose the mortgage deduction and 
property tax deduction on the $160 billion of  reduced housing capital. The 
reduced capital corresponds to mortgages of $80 billion and, at the initial in- 
flation rate of  2 percent, mortgage interest deductions of  8.2 percent of this 
$80 billion, or $6.6 billion. The reduced stock of owner-occupied housing also 
reduces property tax deductions by  2.5 percent of  $160 billion of  forgone 
housing, or $4 billion. Combining these two reductions in itemized deductions 
($10.6 billion) and applying a marginal tax rate of 25 percent implies a revenue 
gain of $2.6 billion. 
Second, the increased capital in the business sector ($160 billion from item- 
izers plus $58 billion from nonitemizers) earns a pretax return of 9.2 percent 
but provides a net-of-tax yield to investors of only 4.54 percent when the infla- 
tion rate is zero. The difference is tax collections of 4.66 percent on the addi- 
tional $218 billion of business capital, or $10.2 billion of additional revenue. 
Third, the reduced housing capital causes a loss of  property tax revenue 
equal to  2.5 percent of the $218 billion reduction in housing capital, or $5.4 
billion. 
Combining these three effects on revenue implies a net  revenue gain of 
$16.9 billion, or 0.30 percent of GDP (at 1991 levels). 
36. The use of the compensated elasticity is a conservative choice in the sense that the uncom- 
pensated elasticity would imply that reduced inflation causes a larger shift of capital out of housing 
and therefore a larger revenue gain for the government. The compensated elasticity is appropriate 
because other taxes are adjusted concurrently to keep total revenue constant. This is different from 
the revenue effect of the tax on saving where the revenue loss takes place in the future and can 
plausibly be assumed to be ignored by  taxpayers at the earlier time when they are making their 
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1.2.3  Welfare Gain from the Housing Sector Effects 
of Reduced Equilibrium Inflation 
The total welfare gain from the effects of lower equilibrium inflation on the 
housing sector is the sum of (1) the traditional welfare gain from the reduced 
distortion to housing consumption, 0.10 percent of GDP, and (2) the welfare 
consequences of the $16.9 billion revenue gain, a revenue gain of 0.30 percent 
of GDP. If each dollar of revenue raised from other taxes involves a deadweight 
loss of X,  this total welfare gain of shifting from 4 percent inflation to 2 percent 
inflation is 
G4  = (0.0010 +  0.0030X)GDP. 
The conservative Ballard et al. (1985) estimate of  X = 0.4 implies that the 
total welfare gain of reducing inflation from 2 percent to zero is 0.22 percent 
of GDP. With the value of X = 1.5 implied by the behavioral estimates for the 
effect of an across-the-board increase in all personal income tax rates, the total 
welfare gain of  reducing inflation from 2 percent to zero is 0.55 percent of 
GDP. These are shown in row 4 of table 1.1. 
Before combining this with the gain from the change in the taxation of sav- 
ings and comparing the sum to the cost of reducing inflation, I turn to two 
other ways  in which a lower equilibrium rate of  inflation affects economic 
welfare through the government’s budget constraint. 
1.3  Seigniorage and  the Distortion of Money Demand 
An  increase  in  inflation  raises  the  cost  of  holding non-interest-bearing 
money balances and therefore reduces the demand for such balances below the 
optimal level. Although the resulting deadweight loss of inflation has been the 
primary focus of the literature on the welfare effects of inflation since Bailey’s 
(1956) pioneering paper, the effect on money demand of reducing the inflation 
rate from 2 percent to zero is small relative to the other effects that have been 
discussed in this paper.37 
This section follows the framework of  sections 1.1 and 1.2 by looking first 
at the distortion of demand for money and then at the revenue consequences 
of the inflation “tax” on the holding of money balances. 
37. Although  the annual effect  is  extremely  small, it  is a perpetual  effect. As I argued in 
Feldstein (1979), in a growing economy a perpetual gain of even a very small fraction of  GDP 
may outweigh the cost of reducing inflation if the appropriate discount rate is low enough relative 
to the rate of aggregate economic growth. In the context of the current paper, however, the welfare 
effect of the reduction in money demand is very small relative to the welfare effects that occur 
because of the interaction of inflation and the tax laws. 33  Capital Income Taxes and the Benefit of Price Stability 
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1.3.1 
As Milton Friedman (1969) has noted, since there is no real cost to increas- 
ing the quantity of money, the optimal inflation rate is such that it completely 
eliminates the cost to the individual of  holding money balances; that is, the 
inflation rate should be such that the nominal interest rate is zero. In an econ- 
omy with no taxes on capital income, the optimal inflation rate would therefore 
be the negative of the real rate of return on capital: a*  = -  p. More generally, 
if we recognize the existence of taxes, the optimal inflation rate is such that the 
nominal after-tax return on alternative financial assets is zero. 
Recall that at a = 0.02 the real net return on the debt-equity portfolio is rn = 
0.0405 and that dr,/da = -0.245.  The optimal inflation rate in this context is 
such that r,,  + T  = 0.38  Figure 1.3 illustrates the reduction in the deadweight 
loss that results if the inflation rate is reduced from a = 0.02 to zero, thereby 
reducing the opportunity costs of  holding money balances from r,  + a = 
0.0605 to the value of r, at a = 0, that is, rn = 0.0454. Since the opportunity 
cost of  supplying money is zero, the welfare gain from reducing inflation is 
the area C + D between the money demand curve and the zero opportunity 
cost line: 
Welfare Effects of Distorting the Demand for Money 
G,  =  0.0454(M, - M,) +  OS(0.0605 - 0.0454)(M, - M.) 
=  0.0530(M, - M.) 
= -0.0530[dM/d(rn +  a)](0.0151) 
(25) 
=  0.00080~~M(r,  + a)-’, 
38. If  dr,ld.ir remains constant, the optimal rate of  inflation is  TI* = -0.060.  Although this 
assumption of  linearity may not be appropriate over the entire range, the basic property that rn > 
T* > -p  is likely to remain valid in a more exact calculation, reflecting the interaction between 
taxes and inflation. 34  Martin Feldstein 
where E~  is the elasticity of money demand with respect to the nominal oppor- 
tunity cost of holding money balances and rn + IT  = 0.0605. 
Since the demand deposit component of M1 is now generally interest bear- 
ing, non-interest-bearing money is now  essentially currency plus  bank re- 
serves. In 1994, currency plus reserves were 6.1 percent of GDP. Thus M  = 
0.061GDP. There is a wide range of estimates of the elasticity of money de- 
mand, corresponding to different definitions of money and different economic 
conditions. An estimate of  E,  = 0.2 may be appropriate in the current context 
with money defined as currency plus bank  With these assumptions, 
G, = 0.00016GDP. Thus, even when  Friedman’s standard for the optimal 
money supply is used, the deadweight loss due to  the distorted demand for 
money balances is only 0.0002GDP. 
1.3.2  Revenue Effects of Reduced Money Demand 
The decline in inflation affects government revenue in three ways. First, the 
reduction in the inflation “tax” on money balances results in a loss of seignior- 
age and therefore an associated welfare loss of raising revenue by other distor- 
tionary taxes (Phelps 1973). In equilibrium, inflation at rate IT  implies revenue 
equal to ITM.  Increasing the inflation rate raises the seigniorage revenue by 
dSeigniorage/dv  =  M  +  n(dM/dv) 
(26)  =  M  +  T[dM/d(rn +  ~r)][d(r,  +  IT)/~IT] 
=  M(1 - &,[d(r,  +  IT)/~IT]T(~,  +  IT)-’]. 
WithM = 0.061GDP, E,  = 0.2, d(r, + .rr)/d.sr = 0.755, IT  = 0.02, and rn + 
IT  = 0.0605, equation (26) implies that d(Seigniorage)/dr = 0.058GDP. A 
decrease of inflation from IT  = 0.02 to IT  = 0 causes a loss of  seigniorage of 
0.1 16 percent of GDP. 
The corresponding welfare loss is 0.1161 percent of GDP. With X = 0.4, the 
welfare cost of the lost seigniorage is 0.046 percent of GDP. With X  = 1.5, 
the welfare cost of the lost seigniorage is 0.174 percent of GDP. 
The second revenue effect is the revenue loss that results from shifting capi- 
tal to money balances from other productive assets. The decrease in business 
capital is equal to the increase in the money stock, M,  -  M2 = [dM/d(rn + 
n)](0.0151)  = 0.0151~~  M(rn + IT-’  = 0.30 percent of  GDP. When these 
assets are invested in business capital, they earn a real pretax return of  9.2 
39. In Feldstein (1979) I assumed an elasticity of one-third for non-interest-bearing MI depos- 
its. I use the lower value now to reflect the fact that non-interest-bearing money is now just cur- 
rency plus bank reserves. These are likely to be less interest sensitive than the demand deposit 
component of M1. The assumption that  .cM = 0.2 when the opportunity cost of holding money 
balances is approximately 0.06 implies that a 1 percentage point increase in rn + 71 reduces M  by 
approximately 0.2(0.01)/0.06  = 0.033, a semielasticity of 3.3.  Since the Cagan (1953) estimates 
of this semielasticity ranged from F = 3 to F = 10, the selection of .cM = 0.2 in the current context 
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percent, but a net-of-tax return of only 4.54 percent. The difference is corpo- 
rate and personal tax payments of 4.66 percent. Applying this to the incremen- 
tal capital of  0.30 percent of  GDP implies a revenue loss of 0.0466(0.30) = 
0.014 percent of  GDP. The welfare gain from this extra revenue is 0.014A 
percent of GDP. With A = 0.4, the welfare loss from this source is 0.006 per- 
cent of GDP, while with X = 1.5, the loss is 0.021 percent of GDP. 
The final revenue effect of the change in the demand for money is the result 
of the government’s ability to substitute the increased money balance of M, - 
M, for interest-bearing government debt. Although this is a one-time substitu- 
tion, it reduces government debt service permanently by  rng(M, -  M,), where 
r,,, is the real interest rate paid by  the government on its outstanding debt net 
of the tax that it collects on those interest payments. A conservative estimate 
of r,,, based on the observed 1994 ratio of interest payments to national debt 
of 0.061, an assumed tax rate of 0.25, and a 1994 inflation rate of 2.7 percent 
is rag  = 0.75(0.061) -  0.027 = 0.018. The reduced debt service cost in perpe- 
tuity is thus 0.018(M, -  M,)  = 0.000054GDP. The corresponding welfare 
gains are 0.002 percent of GDP at X = 0.4 and 0.008 percent of GDP at A = 
1.5. 
Combining these three effects yields a net welfare loss due to decreased 
revenue of 0.05 percent of  GDP if  X  = 0.4 and of 0.19 percent of  GDP if 
X = 1.5. 
Although all of the effects that depend on the demand for money are small, 
the welfare loss from reduced seigniorage revenue is much larger than the wel- 
fare gain from the reduced distortion of money demand and the shift of assets 
to taxpaying business investments. When considering this small reduction in 
inflation,  the  Phelps  revenue effect dominates the  Bailey  money  demand 
effect. 
1.4  Debt Service and the Government Budget Constraint 
The final effect of  reduced inflation that I will consider is the higher real 
cost of servicing the national debt that results from a reduction in the rate of 
inflation. This higher debt service cost occurs because inflation leaves the real 
pretax interest rate on government debt unchanged while the inflation premium 
is subject to tax at the personal level. A lower inflation rate therefore does not 
change the pretax cost of debt service but reduces the tax revenue on govern- 
ment debt payments. This in turn requires a higher level of other distortionary 
taxes.4O 
To assess the effect of inflation on the net cost of debt service, note that the 
increase in the outstanding stock of government debt (B)  can be written as 
40.  Note that the effect of inflation on business tax revenue (through the tax-inflation interaction 
on depreciation and corporate debt) has been counted in the above discussion of taxes and saving. 
This ignores the role of retained earnings and the effect of changes in the mixture of corporate 
investment on the overall tax revenue. 36  Martin Feldstein 
AB  = (rg  +  T)B  +  G - T - O,(rg  +  T)B, 
where rg + T  is the nominal pretax interest rate of government debt and Oi is 
the effective rate of tax on such interest payments. Thus (rg  + T)B  is the gross 
interest payment on the government debt and (1 - €I,)($  + T)B  is the net 
interest on that debt. G is all other government spending, and T is all tax reve- 
nue other than the revenue collected from taxing the interest on government 
debt. 
In equilibrium, the stock of government debt must grow at the same rate as 
nominal GDP; that is, AB = B(n + g + T), where n is the rate of growth of 
population and g is the rate of growth of per capita output. Combining this 
equilibrium condition with equation (27) implies 
(28)  T/GDP  =  G/GDP + [(I - Oi)rg -  - g - O,T]B/GDP. 
Thus ~(T/GDP)/~T  = -  O,(B/GDP). 
Reducing the inflation rate from 2 percent to zero increases the real cost of 
debt service (i.e., increases the level of taxes required to maintain the existing 
debt-GDP ratio) by 0.020,B.  With Oi  = 0.25 and the current debt-GDP ratio of 
BIGDP = 0.5, the 2 percentage point reduction would reduce tax revenue by 
0.25 percent of GDP and would therefore reduce welfare by 0.25A percent of 
GDP. The welfare cost of increased net debt service is therefore between 0.10 
percent of GDP and 0.38 percent of GDP, depending on the value of  A. These 
figures are shown in row 6 of table 1.1. 
1.5  Net Effect of Lower Inflation on Economic Welfare 
Before bringing together the several effects of reduced inflation that have 
been identified and evaluated in sections 1.1 through 1.4, it is useful to com- 
ment on some changes in income that should not be counted in evaluating the 
welfare gain. 
First, if  lower inflation causes an increase in saving, there will be more re- 
tirement consumption. Although it is tempting to count all of this extra income 
as a benefit of lower inflation, part of it is just a shift along an intertemporal 
indifference curve. It is only because we start from a second-best situation in 
which taxes distort consumption timing that a shift to more retirement con- 
sumption constitutes a gain in well-being. Moreover, it is only this welfare gain 
and not the portion of the extra income that is just a shift along the indifference 
curve that should be counted. Subsection 1.1.1 correctly counts the welfare 
gain and does not include the additional retirement income that is just balanced 
by lower preretirement consumption. 
Second, the increase in the capital stock that results if  saving rises causes 
the marginal product of labor to rise and labor incomes to increase. This should 
not be counted because, at least to a first-order approximation, it is balanced 
by a corresponding decrease in capital income. To see this, consider again the 37  Capital Income Taxes and the Benefit of  Price Stability 
Cobb-Douglas assumption of subsection 1.1.1 (y  = P  and sy = nk, where s  is 
the saving rate and n is the growth of population and technology). This implies 
that y = (s/n)b’(’-b).  The level of national income therefore rises in the same pro- 
portion as the ratio of the saving rates raised to the power b/(  1 -  b).  With qsr = 
0.4, the level of real income in equilibrium rises by a factor of (  1.035)0.333  = 
1.0115, or by  1.15 percent. This includes both labor and capital income. 
Consider first the extra labor income. With a Cobb-Douglas technology and 
a labor coefficient of b = 0.75, the extra labor income (pretax) that results as 
the increased capital stock raises the marginal product of  labor is 75 percent 
of the 1.15 percent of GDP, or 0.008625GDP. But now consider what happens 
to the preexisting capital income as the increased capital intensity drives down 
the marginal product of capital. That preexisting capital income was 25 percent 
of  GDP. Footnote 10 showed that the marginal product of  capital falls from 
0.0920 to 0.0889. This reduces the pretax capital income on the existing capital 
stock  by  0.0031/0.0920  of  its  original  value,  that  is,  by  (0.0031/ 
0.092)0.25GDP = 0.00842GDP. Except for rounding errors, this just balances 
the extra labor income. 
I return now to table  1.1, which summarizes the four effects assessed in 
sections 1.1 through 1.4, distinguishing the direct effects of reduced distortion 
and the indirect effects that occur through the change in revenue. Separate values 
are given for the alternative saving demand elasticities (qs,  = 0.4, qsr  = 0, and 
qs,  = 1.0) and for the alternative estimates of the deadweight loss per dollar 
of revenue raised through alternative distorting taxes (h  = 0.4 and A = 1.5). 
These relatively large gains from reduced inflation reflect primarily the fact 
that the existing system of  capital taxation imposes large deadweight losses 
even in the absence of inflation and that these deadweight losses are exacer- 
bated by inflation. 
Reducing these distortions by lowering the rate of inflation produces annual 
welfare gains of  1.14 percent of  GDP in the benchmark saving case where 
there is a very  small positive relation between saving and the real net rate of 
interest (qs,  = 0.4). The deadweight loss distortions in the other two cases, 
also shown at the bottom of  column (l),  are 0.85 percent of GDP and 1.56 
percent of GDP. 
The additional welfare effects of  changes in revenue, summarized at the 
bottom of columns (2) and (3), can be either negative or positive but on balance 
are smaller than the direct effects of reduced distortion. In the benchmark case 
of  qs,  = 0.4, the total revenue effects reduce welfare but the reductions are 
relatively small (between -0.10  at A = 0.4 and -0.38  at A = 1.5). 
The total welfare effect of reducing inflation from 2 percent to zero is there- 
fore a gain in the benchmark saving case of between 0.76 percent of GDP a 
year and 1.04 percent of GDP a year. A higher saving response increases the 
net gain while a lower saving response reduces it. 
If the cost of reducing the inflation rate from 2 percent to zero is a one-time 
cumulative loss of  6 percent of  GDP, as Ball’s  (1994) analysis discussed in 38  Martin Feldstein 
section 3.2 of Feldstein (1997) implies, the estimated gains in the benchmark 
case would offset this cost within six to eight years. If  saving is more respon- 
sive, the gain from price stability would offset the cost even more quickly. 
Only if saving is completely interest inelastic and revenue raising has a high 
deadweight loss does the estimated total effect imply that the welfare gains 
would take more than a decade to exceed the lost GDP that is required to 
achieve price stability. Even in this case, the present value of the annual bene- 
fits of eliminating inflation exceeds 10 percent of the initial GDP if the growing 
benefit  stream is discounted by  the historic real return on the Standard & 
Poor’s portfolio. 
1.6  Summary and Conclusion 
The calculations in this paper imply that the interaction of existing tax rules 
and inflation causes a significant welfare loss in the United States even at a 
low rate of  inflation. More specifically, the analysis implies that shifting the 
equilibrium rate of  inflation from 2 percent to zero would cause a perpetual 
welfare gain equal to about 1 percent of GDP a year. The deadweight loss of 2 
percent inflation is so large because inflation exacerbates the distortions that 
would be caused by existing capital income taxes even with price stability. 
To assess the desirability of achieving price stability, the gain from eliminat- 
ing this loss has to be compared with the one-time cost of  disinflation. The 
evidence summarized in Feldstein (1997) implies that the cost of shifting from 
2 percent inflation to price stability is estimated to be about 6 percent of GDP. 
Since the 1 percent of GDP annual welfare gain from price stability continues 
forever and grows at the same rate as GDP (i.e., at about 2.5 percent a year), 
the present value of the welfare gain is very large. Discounting the annual gains 
at the rate that investors require for risky equity investments (i.e., at the 5.1 
percent real net-of-tax rate of return on the Standard & Poor’s portfolio from 
1969 to 1994) implies a present value gain equal to more than 35 percent of 
the initial level of GDP. The benefit of achieving price stability therefore sub- 
stantially exceeds its cost. 
This welfare gain could in principle also be achieved by eliminating all capi- 
tal income taxes or by indexing capital income taxes so that taxes are based 
only on real income and real expenses. Feldstein (1997, sec. 3.8) discusses the 
technical and administrative difficulties that are likely to keep such indexing 
from being adopted, an implication borne out by recent legislative experience. 
The magnitude of the annual gain from reducing inflation is so large that the 
expected present value of the gain from disinflating from 2 percent inflation to 
price stability would be positive even if there were a 50 percent chance that 
capital income taxes will be completely eliminated or the income tax com- 
pletely indexed after 10 years. 
The analysis of this paper does not discuss the distributional consequences 
of  the disinflation or of the reduced inflation. Some readers may believe that 39  Capital Income Taxes and the Benefit of Price Stability 
the output loss caused by the disinflation should be weighted more heavily than 
the gain from low inflation because the output loss falls disproportionately on 
lower income individuals and does so in the form of the large individual losses 
associated with unemployment. It would, however, take very large weights to 
overcome the difference between the 5 percent of GDP output loss of disinfla- 
tion and the 35+ percent of GDP present value gain from lower inflation. 
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Comment  Stanley Fischer 
I very much appreciate the opportunity offered by the invitation to discuss this 
paper of  Martin Feldstein’s, whose recent work on the benefits of  reducing 
inflation has attracted so much attention. 
Stanley Fischer is first deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund. 
Views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily of  the IMF. 41  Capital Income Taxes and the Benefit of Price Stability 
Over a decade ago, an estimate that a reduction of the inflation rate from 10 
percent to zero could bring net benefits equal to about 2 percent of GDP was 
regarded as high (Fischer 1981)-and  that estimate included a variety of costs 
due to the greater uncertainty about future price levels associated with higher 
inflation rates. Now we have the startling claim that the benefits of reducing 
inflation from 2 percent to zero amount to 1 percent of GDP, currently about 
$70 billion per annum. As table 1.1 shows, this is the sum of  four partial ef- 
fects, in which by coincidence the total welfare effects are approximately equal 
to those arising from the single effect of  the distortion to the timing of con- 
sumption caused by  the reduction in the after-tax return to saving associated 
with higher inflation. 
The Basic Model 
The distortion is that individuals consume too much while young. If inflation 
were lower (by 200 basis points), (1) the net corporate rate of return would rise 
by  12 basis points from 5.40 to 5.52 percent and (2)  the net return to the indi- 
vidual saver would rise by 49 basis points from 4.05 to 4.54 percent. Feldstein 
estimates that saving by  individuals who save (as opposed to those who are 
dissaving in the second period of their lives) amounts to 9 percent of GDP. 
It follows that with an uncompensated interest elasticity of saving of 0.4, the 
welfare gain from the reduction in inflation amounts to 1.02 percent of GDP. 
Corresponding to the increase in saving is an impressive 5 percent increase in 
the steady state capital stock. 
To understand this result, note that there is also a significant welfare gain, 
amounting to 0.73 percent of  GDP, even with a zero uncompensated income 
elasticity of saving. This benefit arises from the higher return on saving, which 
makes higher second-period consumption possible even though there is no in- 
crease in first-period saving. 
The basic result is startling, especially for macroeconomists used to thinking 
about the costs of inflation in terms of such easy metaphors as menu and shoe 
leather costs. Feldstein’s paper requires us to change gears and think about the 
plausibility of a two-period model in which the key parameters are unfamiliar 
and have  no easy empirical counterparts. For instance, we need to consider 
whether (1) the relevant interest elasticity of saving in the first (30-year) period 
of life is 0.4 and (2)  the basic intertemporal distortion in consumption in the 
U.S. economy is one in which consumption later in life is too low relative to 
that earlier in life. 
Let me address the second point and suggest that factors omitted from the 
Feldstein analysis may  create an opposite distortion. Specifically, it is often 
argued that the young face liquidity constraints and cannot consume as much 
early in life as they would like. Perhaps the right model should include three 
periods, starting with a period of no or low earning in which individuals would 
like to consume more than their income. Second, it is more frequently argued 
that the elderly consume more than they should rather than less. Thus it is far 42  Martin Feldstein 
from clear that the two-period model set up in this paper is the right one for 
calculating the costs of the intertemporal distortion caused by capital income 
taxation; and it is quite likely that the analysis overstates the costs of the inter- 
temporal distortion. 
Most important, we should note that this paper is entirely an argument for 
reducing capital taxation. Injation is essentially incidental to the argument- 
reducing inflation is simply a means of reducing capital income taxation. Why 
not make the argument for reducing capital income taxation directly? In part 
that may be because the analytic arguments in favor of reducing capital income 
taxation seem to have run out of steam, for reasons that I will have to leave to 
experts in the field to elaborate. 
Other Considerations 
Several other points need to be taken into account in appraising Feldstein’s 
striking result. 
1.  The paper gives short shrift to the argument, recently developed further 
by Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996), that because of downward wage inflex- 
ibility, there is a significant nonlinearity in the long-term Phillips curve at zero 
inflation. I do not believe that the Akerlof-Dickens-Perry argument would hold 
in the longest of long runs because downward wage inflexibility is only a con- 
vention, not a structural feature of the economy. But I do believe that because 
economies have operated for so long with positive inflation, it will take a long 
time for downward wage flexibility to develop in response to high unemploy- 
ment at a zero inflation rate. 
There is a second important argument supporting the view that the average 
rate of inflation should be above zero. It is that when a recession threatens, it 
may be useful to have a negative real interest rate. Since the nominal interest 
rate cannot fall below zero, the real interest rate can be lower when the ex- 
pected inflation rate is around 2 percent than when it is zero. This may sound 
like a theoretical issue, but I believe that such considerations are relevant to 
recent Japanese experience. 
2.  Feldstein makes much of the argument that the output costs of disinfla- 
tion are transitory while the welfare gains from reducing the taxation of saving 
are permanent. However, this is misleading in a model in which the period 
length is about 30 years. The welfare gains to which Feldstein refers are gar- 
nered only when consumption in the second period of life rises. Taken literally, 
that means after 30 years, long after the output costs of disinflation have been 
incurred. Indeed, in the early period-the  first 30 years-consumption  either 
does not rise or falls when the return to saving rises. Thus the overall welfare 
impact measured for, say, the first 10 or 20 years would likely be negative, 
not positive. 
3.  The paper is a surprising combination of sweeping statements and com- 
plicated calculations. Feldstein says-and  it is hard to disagree-that  there is 43  Capital Income Taxes and the Benefit of Price Stability 
a surprising amount of  money illusion among market participants. But it is 
precisely these money-illusioned market participants who are supposed to be 
increasing their saving in response to a decline in the nominal rate of return on 
saving, albeit one that corresponds to a real increase. 
4.  It is possible that there is a political economy equilibrium that determines 
the rate of taxation of capital income. Quite possibly an inflation-induced de- 
cline in capital taxation would lead to an offsetting increase in explicit tax rates 
on capital income. 
5. Inevitably, inflation will fluctuate around its average value. This means 
that so long as the tax system is nominal, the effective rate of taxation of capital 
will vary with inflation. The distortions do not balance out over the cycle, and 
they will be present so long as capital income taxation is not indexed. The 
right answer to the Feldstein analysis is to index capital income taxation. The 
argument for indexation of capital income taxes has been made repeatedly in 
the United States-and  rejected just as often.' But the same could have been 
said until 1996 about the argument for government issue of an indexed bond. 
And the topic of indexation of capital gains is once again actively on the table 
in the current budget talks. 
6.  Finally, let me note that this is the second paper by Feldstein developing 
this line of argument. But it is not logically the last, for there is nothing in the 
analysis of this paper that suggests the optimal rate of inflation in thisframe- 
work is zero. Rather, given the substantial gains from reducing inflation to 
zero, there are certainly further gains from shifting to negative inflation rates. 
Another paper could be written in this series, arguing for the benefits of, say, 
inflation of minus 2 or 3 percent or perhaps minus 4.5 percent. 
If  that paper were written, it would have to confront the questions of why 
economies have almost always behaved poorly in periods of very low inflation 
or deflation, and whether the best way of reducing the taxation of capital is by 
changing the average inflation rate. 
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Discussion Summary 
Martin Feldstein thanked Stanley Fischer for his insightful remarks and made 
the following comments in response. 
If  some individuals are prevented from consuming as much as they want 
because of liquidity constraints, they will appear in the data as nonsavers. As 
the paper notes, reducing the effective marginal tax rate for such individuals 
would either have no effect (because the constraint would continue to bind) or 
would be sufficient to induce those individuals to save. To the extent that the 
constraints would remain binding, the current welfare analysis is correct to 
ignore those individuals. If  some would respond to lower inflation by saving 
more, the analysis understates the gain from shifting to price stability. 
Although the model literally implies that the optimal level of  inflation is 
negative, the policy option to be examined is price stability, not negative infla- 
tion. Price stability has the special property that it is the only inflation rate that 
eliminates the necessity  to  distinguish between  real and nominal changes. 
While economists have no trouble with this, in reality the distinction leads to 
confusion and misjudgments. Moreover, negative inflation rates are simply not 
politically feasible. 
While Congress could in principle reduce taxes on capital income to achieve 
the same efficiency gains as would be achieved by  eliminating inflation, as a 
practical matter Congress is not likely to do this in the foreseeable future. The 
Federal Reserve must take the tax law (and other institutional arrangements) 
as given when it makes monetary policy. As economists evaluating monetary 
policy, we must also take into account the existing institutional arrangements 
that affect the costs and benefits of different Federal Reserve actions. 
Alan Auerbach noted that the analysis appears to imply that inflation is too 
low if one only considers seigniorage benefits and shoe leather costs of infla- 
tion and wondered if this corresponds to findings in the literature. Feldstein 
responded that Edmund Phelps has calculated the optimal rate of  inflation, 
provided that only shoe leather and revenue effects are taken into account, and 
found that it is indeed higher than current rates. 
Auerbach also remarked that the magnitude of the benefits that are based on 
lower effective capital income taxes seems inconsistent with the simulation 
results of Auerbach and Kotlikoff and wondered what could explain the dis- 
crepancy. He also inquired about the effects of the relative costs of housing 
and nonhousing capital. A lower tax on nonhousing capital has two effects: it 
raises saving and it draws capital from the housing sector into the nonhousing 
sector. The effect on the stock of housing capital seems ambiguous, so why is 
the welfare gain in the housing sector so large? He then questioned the ratio- 
nale for Feldstein’s use of an uncompensated saving elasticity to calculate the 
revenue effect on capital income taxes and the statement that using an uncom- 
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elasticity. Finally, he wondered why Feldstein did not use underlying utility 
function parameters rather than observed saving behavior. 
Stephen Cecchetti remarked that the results depend largely on the sophisti- 
cation of people to react to the fact that price stability lowers effective capital 
income taxes. The analysis assumes that people are smart and react to lower 
effective capital income taxes but that Congress will not increase capital in- 
come taxes to keep the effective rate the same. He wondered how long it would 
take, in practice, for Congress to react. 
Laurence Ball noted that the author estimated that the benefits of price sta- 
bility outweigh the costs of disinflation if the benefits exceed 0.16 percent of 
GDP per annum. In his opinion, this hurdle is too low. The loss of GDP in a 
disinflation underestimates the social costs of a recession because the costs of 
a recession are distributed unequally. 
Andrew Abel remarked that adding up costs and benefits of partial equilib- 
rium calculations poses no problem in the present analysis, a fact confirmed 
by the general equilibrium calculations that he presented as the discussant of 
Feldstein (1997). He also noted that the optimal negative inflation rate equal- 
izes the return on money holdings to the after-tax return of capital. Hence, it 
would be on the order of minus 5 percent rather than minus 9 percent. 
Laurence Meyer raised the issue of how to deal with the effect of inflation 
on the real interest rate. The impact should depend on the saving elasticity, but 
in Martin Feldstein’s analysis the real interest rate faced by  firms is fixed by 
assumption. In the general equilibrium analysis by Andrew Abel, the real after- 
tax interest rate is fixed by the structure of the model. One should therefore be 
careful about critical assumptions that may  drive results. He also wondered 
whether the capital income tax rates used in the paper overstate the effective 
average marginal capital income tax rates because of  the prevalence of  tax- 
preferred savings vehicles such as 401  (k)s and individual retirement accounts 
(IRAs). 
Benjamin Friedman noted that the tax system has features, such as 401(k)s, 
IRAs, loss offset, and stepped-up basis, that lower effective capital income 
taxes. In other words, the tax system may be moving in the right direction from 
the perspective of  Feldstein’s paper. He also suggested that the preferential 
treatment of owner-occupied housing may be an intentional feature of the tax 
system because society really may have a desire to stimulate owner-occupied 
housing. 
Feldstein replied to the last two comments by noting, first, that such tax- 
preferred saving is only relevant if  it is the marginal form of  saving for the 
individual. He explained that the correct tax rate to use is a weighted average 
marginal tax rate, where the average is weighted by the amount of saving done. 
Because most saving is done by  people who save a relatively large amount, 
most saving is done by  those for whom IRAs and 401(k)s are inframarginal. 
Therefore, these tax-preferred savings vehicles are only of minor importance 46  Martin Feldstein 
to the analysis. Moreover, even saving that is not taxed at the individual level 
is subject to tax at the corporate level. 
Feldstein further noted that the favorable tax treatment of housing increases 
not only the fraction of the population that chooses to own but, more important, 
the average amount of housing capital among those who do own. Even if public 
policy wants to encourage homeownership, there are large distortions in the 
amount of housing capital. 
Anna Schwartz questioned the ability of a central bank to deliver a certain 
inflation rate with any precision. 
Juan Dolado said he would like to know what can be learned from recent 
experience in Japan, which has had a zero inflation rate. 
Stanley Fischer observed that not everyone faces a marginal return to saving 
of 4.2 percent and wonders how this can be incorporated. He also noted that 
Andrew Abel’s  general equilibrium model differs substantially from Martin 
Feldstein’s model because in Abel’s  model people do not derive utility from 
housing capital. Hence, the observation that Abel’s and Feldstein’s calculations 
yield similar results does not imply that a sum of partial equilibrium results is 
a good approximation to a general equilibrium result. Feldstein noted in reply 
that Abel’s  calculation does cause housing capital to raise individual utility 
because it produces the “income” that individuals consume. 
In response to the question about the use of the uncompensated saving elas- 
ticity, Feldstein said that he believes this is the most realistic way of modeling 
people’s responses. However, for the final results, it makes little difference 
whether a compensated or uncompensated elasticity is used in the revenue 
calculation. The model is calibrated using the uncompensated saving elasticity 
rather than an underlying preference parameter such as the elasticity of inter- 
temporal substitution because we have a better knowledge about the magnitude 
of the saving elasticity than about underlying preference parameters. 
On the issue of possible political adjustments to capital income taxation in 
response to lower inflation, Feldstein noted that we still do not index taxes for 
inflation. Moreover, changes to the corporate income tax constitute only a very 
crude way  of  adjusting for the effects of  inflation on capital income taxes. 
Looking at the past, he could not discern a clear relation between capital in- 
come tax reform and inflation. 
In response to the comment by Ball, Feldstein noted that his calculations 
imply that the benefits of price stability would easily outweigh the costs even 
if the social costs of disinflation are twice Ball’s original estimate of 0.16 per- 
cent of GDP per year. 